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Abstract. This paper investigates the vulnerability of urban traffic networks to cyber-
attacks on traffic lights. We model traffic signal tampering as a bi-objective optimization
problem that simultaneously seeks to reduce vehicular throughput in the network over
time (maximize impact) while introducing minimal changes to network signal timings
(minimize noticeability). We represent the Spatio-temporal traffic dynamics as a static net-
work flow problem on a time-expanded graph. This allows us to reduce the (non-convex)
attack problem to a tractable form, which can be solved using traditional techniques used
to solve linear network programming problems. We show that minor but objective ad-
justments in the signal timings over time can severely impact traffic conditions at the
network level. We investigate network vulnerability by examining the concavity of the
Pareto-optimal frontier obtained by solving the bi-objective attack problem. Numerical
experiments are carried to illustrate the types of insights that can be extracted from the
Pareto-optimal frontier. For instance, our experiments suggest that the vulnerability of a
traffic network to signal tampering is independent of the demand levels.
Keywords: Network vulnerability, signal tampering, traffic flow dynamics, urban traffic
networks, adversarial attacks, cyber-security.
1 Introduction
Urban network control has evolved from stan-
dalone control devices into sophisticated cyber-
physical systems, where the integration of cyber
elements such as sensing devices, communication
channels and control units has greatly influenced
the physical flow dynamics and the network con-
trollability [17]. Various state-of-the art adaptive
traffic signal control algorithms which rely on these
cyber elements have been designed to better man-
age and control the vehicular flows through these
networks [10, 12, 13]. This, however, has introduced
vulnerabilities in traffic networks, especially to cy-
? Corresponding author, Email: sej7@nyu.edu
ber attacks, an issue that has gained recent attention
[5, 6, 9, 11].
We study the vulnerability of urban road net-
works to traffic signal tampering attacks [9], which
involves adversarial adjustment of signal settings to
negatively impact network-wide traffic operations.
For example, an adversary with unauthorized ac-
cess to the traffic signal control infrastructure can
set the traffic signal timings to a sub-optimal config-
uration so as cause reduced intersection throughput
and excessive queuing. This effect, albeit local, has
impacts that propagate to neighboring intersections
and, over longer periods of time, can cripple an en-
tire network. We specifically consider two critical
aspects of such attacks: their impact on network traf-
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fic conditions and their noticeability to the network
operators/controllers and other users. Using a bi-
criteria optimization framework, we show that such
unnoticeable but objective adjustments to the traffic
signal settings over a pre-determined time period
can create cascading traffic congestion in the urban
road network.
Optimizing a dynamical traffic system to achieve
the desired (adversarial) objective presents a chal-
lenging task. For instance, to model the time-
varying network traffic conditions as a function of
traffic signal timing changes, it is important to cap-
ture the traffic queue build-up and dissipation at
each intersection in the network with reasonable
level of detail. This renders the mathematical for-
mulation of the optimization problem more com-
plex and, thus, more difficult to solve. Moreover,
to incorporate signalized intersection control in the
formulation, it is essential to capture interactions
between conflicting movements at the intersections.
These typically require the use of integer variables,
particularly if time is treated as a discrete variable.
Examples of such formulations include [3, 14–16],
which use large numbers of binary variables, and
researchers often resort to meta-heuristic solution
methods given such difficulties; see for example
[7, 9].
The dynamical nature of the problem coupled
with the discrete nature of signal control introduces
modeling complexities that we overcome with a
super-graph representation of the problem. Our
super-graph is a directed graph, which compactly
captures the Spatio-temporal evolution of vehicu-
lar flow dynamics of any real-world traffic network.
Using reasonable approximations, this equivalent
representation of traffic allows us to exploit simple
solution techniques that are based on dynamic pro-
gramming principles. Moreover, the super-graph
representation permit us to convert the bi-objective
optimization signal tampering problem to a more
tractable form with polynomial complexity. This
is based on the total unimodularity property of the
adjacency matrices of graphs, for which integer op-
timal solutions are obtained by solving the trivial
linear relaxation of the respective problem [1, 20];
further on this in Sec. 2.2. Finally, we also propose a
network vulnerability measure based on the prop-
erties of the solution set obtained by solving the
bi-objective attack problem. The solution set forms
an Pareto-optimal frontier [4], its properties provide
critical insights to the vulnerability of the network.
In short, we develop a novel static representation of
traffic network dynamics as static flows on a static
directed graph in Sec. 2. We then present an attack
model for urban road network traffic via signal tam-
pering and demonstrate that it can be solved to op-
timality using classical bi-objective programming
techniques that were developed for linear problems
in Sec. 3. In Sec. 4, we conduct numerical experi-
ments on a four toy networks to illustrate some of
the insights that can be extracted from the Pareto-
optimal frontier that is obtained as an output of the
bi-objective attack problem.
2 Modeling urban network traffic flows
2.1 Network traffic dynamics
We use a cell-based traffic flow model to capture
the vehicular flow dynamics of an urban road net-
work. That is, we divide network road segments
(links) into smaller sections (cells) to capture the
build-up and dissipation of congestion within the
network links. The model assumes space and time
to be discrete, and that flows across cell boundaries
do not exceed the numbers of vehicles in the send-
ing cells, the capacities of the two cells, or maxi-
mum occupancy of the downstream cell. Let T ≡
{0, 1, . . . , |T |} denote the set of discrete time steps
with a finite horizon |T |. We use a uniform discrete
time step length of ∆τ, that is, time t ∈ T represents
t∆τ units of time (typically seconds) from the initial
time step. Let C denote the set of network cells; the
length of each cell ∆x depends on the distance trav-
eled by a vehicle at free flow speed over an interval
of length ∆τ. For example, if ∆τ = 1 second and
the free-flow speed is 90 km/hr, then the cells are
chosen to be ∆x = 25 meters in length and the road
segments are discretized accordingly. We denote by
xti the occupancy of cell i ∈ C at time t ∈ T. We rep-
resent the flows between adjacent cells by objects
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(a) A single lane
merging section
(c) A single lane
diverging section
(b) A single lane 
straight section
(d) Cell-node diagram of 
merging section
(f) Cell-node diagram of 
diverging section
(e) Cell-node diagram of 
straight section
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FIGURE 1: Illustration of the directed graph representation for a simple road network.
that we refer to as “connectors” [21] and denote by
ytij the number of vehicles using connector (i, j) at
time t ∈ T, i.e., the number of vehicles departing
cell i ∈ C into adjacent cell j ∈ C at time t. We denote
the set of connectors in the network by L. The flow
capacity of cell i is denoted by Qi; this represents the
maximal number of vehicles that can flow through
the cell in single time step (∆τ). We chose ∆τ so
that Qi = 1 vehicle per ∆τ units of time (per lane)
and adjust the cell lengths accordingly. We demon-
strate below that little generality is lost in making
this assumption. The maximum occupancy of cell i
is denoted by Ni; this represents the maximal num-
ber of vehicles that can be present in the cell in units
of vehicles per ∆x units of distance.
Network intersections are modeled as ordinary
cells connected to transshipment nodes. The dif-
ference between nodes and cells is that network
nodes only serve as transfer stations and do not
hold any vehicles. The set of all such transshipment
nodes in the network is denoted by B = BD ∪ BM,
where BD and BM are sets of diverging and merging
nodes, respectively; the former are nodes with one
inbound connector (one incoming flow) and one
or more outbound connectors, the latter are nodes
with one or more inbound connectors and only one
outbound connector. Intersections with multiple in-
bound flows and multiple outbound flows are rep-
resented by more than one node in BD and BM as
illustrated below. For each i ∈ C ∪ B, we denote
by Γ(i)− ⊂ C ∪ B the adjacent network objects that
are in the immediate upstream of cell (or transship-
ment node) i. Similarly, Γ(i)+ ⊂ C ∪ B is the set
of adjacent cells or transshipment nodes that are in
the immediate downstream of i. This cell-node rep-
resentation is illustrated in Fig. 1 for a typical two
intersection system.
Traffic dynamics. We divide the set of network
cells C into disjoint sets of “ordinary” cells CO,
“source” cells CR, and “sink” cells CS, i.e., C =
CO ∪ CR ∪ CS. Ordinary cells are those on the in-
terior of the network, while source and sink cells
are on the boundary of the network. By boundary,
we mean any object that is adjacent to the exterior
of the network, this includes the extremities of the
network and interior locations that are connected
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to interior sources or sinks (such as parking struc-
tures). For i ∈ CO the dynamics are given by the
mass balance equation
xti − xt−1i − yt−1hi + yt−1ij = 0, (1)
where {h} = Γ(i)− and {j} = Γ(i)+. For source
cells i ∈ CR, the dynamics are written as
xti − xt−1i + yt−1ij = dti , (2)
where dti is the exogenous demand at source cell i.
Similarly, for i ∈ CS, the dynamics follow the mass
balance equation
xti − xt−1i − yt−1hi = 0. (3)
Flows through diverge (i ∈ BD) and merge (i ∈ BM)
nodes are represented, for each t ∈ T , by
∑
j∈Γ(i)+
ytij − ythi = 0 (4)
and
ytij − ∑
h∈Γ(i)−
ythi = 0, (5)
respectively. To capture the physical constraints on
the connector flow, we impose the constraint
ytij ≤ min{xti , Qi, Qj, Nj − xtj + ytjk}. (6)
That is, the flow on the connector cannot exceed (i)
the number of vehicles in the sending cell i
ytij − xti ≤ 0, (7)
(ii) the flow capacities of both the sending cell i and
the receiving cell j (Qij ≡ min{Qi, Qj}):
ytij ≤ Qij, (8)
and (iii) the available space in the receiving cell j
(accounting for departing flows ytjk):
ytij + x
t
j − ytjk ≤ Nj. (9)
Intersection conflicting movements. Additional con-
straints arise as a result of conflicts at network in-
tersections. We now show that these constraints can
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(b)(a)(a) A pair of conflicting movements
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(b)(a) (b) Modified representation to capture con-
flicts
FIGURE 2: Modeling conflicting movements.
be represented graphically. Consider a pair of inter-
section movements that conflict with one another,
e.g., the two opposing through movements shown
in Fig. 2a. The two movements are represented by
connectors: (i, j) and (p, q). The conflict dictates
that the connector flows cannot be simultaneously
positive. To capture this, we can introduce a pair of
binary variables αtij, α
t
pq ∈ {0, 1} so that αtij + αtpq ≤ 1
for all t ∈ T . For these two movements, the con-
nector capacity constraints are given by ytij ≤ Qijαtij
and ytpq ≤ Qpqαtpq. For the case where both (i, j)
and (p, q) have the same (single-lane) flow capac-
ity: Qij = Qpq = 1 vehicle per ∆τ, these constraints
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can alternatively be written as
ytij + y
t
pq ≤ 1 (10)
along with ytij, y
t
pq ∈ {0, 1}. In order to represent
this graphically, we introduce two transshipment
nodes, u and v as depicted in Fig. 2b and add the
associated mass-balance equations to the system:
ytuv − ytiu − ytpu = 0 (11)
and
ytvj + y
t
vq − ytuv = 0 (12)
along with a capacity constraint on the new connec-
tor:
ytuv ≤ 1. (13)
Connectors (i, u) and (p, u) represent the outbound
flows from cells i and p, while connectors (v, j) and
(v, q) represent the inbound flows into cells j and
q, respectively. Note that all of the associated con-
nector flows ytiu, y
t
pu, ytuv, ytvj, and y
t
vq are binary vari-
ables in this modified representation. In this setup,
separate cells for each of the turning movements
proposed in previous work [3, 14] is not needed.
Our setup can also accommodate many different
types of phasing schemes when considering signal
timing; any two movements may proceed through
the intersection simultaneously as long as they do
not conflict. This is in contrast to the two phase se-
tups in [16], [14] and [3]. Also, the binary variables
αtij representing the conflicting signal phases are no
longer required to enforce conflict free flows at the
intersection and we, henceforth, shall treat them
as exogenous variables that are inferred from the
other flow variables. We also note that approaches
with different capacities (approaches with different
numbers of lanes) can also be accommodated in
this framework as illustrated in the simple example
shown in Fig. 3.
2.2 Super graph: A static representation of traf-
fic dynamics
We now demonstrate how the equations describ-
ing the system dynamics and the conflicting flows
Q = 2 Q = 2
Q = 1
Q = 1
(b)(a)(a) Intersection layout
Q = 2 Q = 2
Q = 1
Q = 1
(b)(a) (b) Network representation of conflicting
movements
FIGURE 3: Network representation of conflicting move-
ments for a simple intersection with two lanes running
west-east and one lane running south-north.
can be captured with a time-expanded static graph,
which we refer to as the super-graph.
To illustrate, consider three adjacent cells i, j, k
in the network as depicted in Fig. 4a. The mass-
balance equations governing the flow dynamics can
be interpreted as flows through a network node.
Take, for instance, the variable xtj representing the
occupancy of cell j in time step t. This variable
appears twice in the system of mass-balance equa-
tions:
xtj − xt−1j − yt−1ij + yt−1jk = 0 (14)
and in the next time step
xt+1j − xtj − ytij + ytjk = 0. (15)
The variable xtj appears in the first equation with a
Page 5
Thonnam Thodi, Mulumba, and Jabari
Noticeability vs. Impact in Traffic Signal Systems
coefficient of +1 and in the second equation with a
coefficient of -1. It can hence be interpreted as tem-
poral flow from a node in time step t into another
copy in time step t + 1. Similarly take the variable
ytij, in addition to its appearance in equation (15)
with a coefficient of -1, it also appears in the mass
balance equation
xt+1i − xti − ythi + ytij = 0 (16)
with a coefficient of +1. It can be interpreted as a
spatial flow. It can be easily seen that all cell occu-
pancy variables {xti}i∈C,t∈T and all connector flow
variables {ytij}(i,j)∈L,t∈T appear twice in the set of
mass-balance equations, once with a coefficient of
+1 and once with a coefficient of -1. The time ex-
panded directed graph associated with the mass
balance equations of cells i, j and k is depicted in
Fig. 4b.
To incorporate the flow conservation constraints
in the super-graph, we first introduce non-negative
slack variables, denoted by sti for each cell i, which
represents the number of vehicles in cell i that do
not advance to neighboring cell j during t. Hence,
they are bounded from above by the maximum oc-
cupancy of cell i:
sti ≤ Ni (17)
and the flow restrictions (7) becomes an equality:
ytij − xti + sti = 0. (18)
Substituting ytij − xti = −sti in the mass balance
equation
xt+1i − xti − ythi + ytij = 0, (19)
we obtain
xt+1i − ythi − sti = 0. (20)
Then keeping (18) in tact and replacing (19) with
(20), we have that each of the variables in the
resulting system of equations {xti , sti}i∈C,t∈T and
{ytij}i∈L,t∈T appears twice, once with a coefficient
of +1 and once with a coefficient of -1. The result-
ing graph for the three-cell example is illustrated in
Fig. 4c.
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(b) Graphical representation of mass-balance equations
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(c) Graphical representation including flow restriction
FIGURE 4: Illustration of the time-expanded representa-
tion of the traffic dynamics.
To fully capture the traffic dynamics, it remains to
accommodate downstream restriction constraints
on the flows (9). We do this by imposing a simple
spatial capacity (max occupancy) constraint, which
is natural:
xti ≤ Ni (21)
for all i ∈ C and all t ∈ T . That the resulting
system of equations respects (9) by simply impos-
ing (21) follows by noting that for any t, mass bal-
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(a) Cell-node representation
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(b) A single layer of the super-graph
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FIGURE 5: Example super-graph generation for a net-
work with cells and transshipment nodes. The super-
graph consists of four layers representing four times
steps
ance implies that xt+1j = x
t
j + y
t
ij − ytjk and since the
right-hand side of (21) is constant throughout the
horizon T , we have that xt+1j ≤ Nj implies that
xtj + y
t
ij− ytjk ≤ Nj, which is the flow restriction con-
straint (9).
We illustrate the overall development of the
super-graph for a network with both cells (road seg-
ments) and transshipment nodes (intersections) in
Fig. 5a. A single layer of the supergraph corre-
sponding to a single time step is shown in Fig. 5b.
The demands {dti}i∈CR,t∈T can be accommodated by
adding a fictitious super-source node R along with
fictitious arcs emanating from R and terminating in
the different copies of the source nodes with capaci-
ties equal to the demands. The same is done for the
network sinks, where we create a super-sink node
S and connect it to the sink nodes via arcs that are
either uncapacitated (for free-boundaries) or are ca-
pacitated by the maximum occupancies of the sink
cells of the network. The super-graph is illustrated
in Fig. 5c.
In summary the network dynamics can be repre-
sented by a system of mass balance equations along
with capacity constraints (8), (17), and (21).
3 Optimal and Adversarial Control
3.1 Compact Notation
In this section, we formulate the optimal and ad-
versarial control problem and show how the super-
graph representation of traffic flow dynamics can be
exploited in solving these problem efficiently. We
first present a compact notation based on the super-
graph developed above. We denote the super-
graph by G = (V ,A), where V are the super-graph
nodes (vertices) and A are the directed arc in the
super-graph. We denote by AV/S ⊂ A the set of
non-sink arcs in the network (in essence AV/S ex-
cludes the fictitious arcs that terminate in the super-
sink node S). The subset of arcs corresponding to
conflicting movements is denoted by Aconf ⊂ A.
Let b ∈ Z|V| denote the demand vector. Define
D ≡ ∑t∈T ,i∈CR dti , then the element of the demand
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vector are given by
di =

D i = R
−D i = S
0 otherwise
. (22)
The arc flows consist of the variables {xti , sti}i∈C,t∈T
and {ytij}i∈L,t∈T , which for simplicity we denote as
the vector x ∈ Z|A|. Let u ∈ Z|A| denote the upper-
bounds on the flows, which correspond to the spa-
tial capacities {Ni}i∈C and the temporal flow capac-
ities {Qi}i∈L. The mass-balance equations are lin-
ear equations in the elements of the vector x and
can hence be represented by a matrix operator on
x, which we denote by A ∈ {−1, 0, 1}|V|×|A|. The
mass balance equations are then written as Ax = b
along with the bounds 0 ≤ x ≤ u. The matrix A
is an arc-node incidence matrix. Such matrices are
known to possess a property called total unimodu-
larity (TU) [1, 20]. In the context of mixed integer
programming, when the constraints matrix is TU,
the trivial linear relaxation produces integer opti-
mal solutions. This is a property that we will capi-
talize on in the next section.
3.2 Optimal control policy
We define the optimal signal control policy as one
that minimizes the total travel time of all vehicles in
the system over the horizon of the problem. This is
modeled as ∆τ1>|AV/S|x|AV/S , where 1|AV/S| is a vector
of ones of size |AV/S| and x|AV/S is the restriction of
the vector x to arcs that lie in AV/S. Since all con-
flicts are accounted for in G naturally,the optimal
control policy can be inferred from the solution of
the network flow problem
minimize
x∈Z|A|+
{
1>|AV/S|x|AV/S : Ax = b, x ≤ u
}
, (23)
where one picks the solution of (23) that involves
the minimal number of signal switches. Note that
the constant ∆τ was dropped from the objective
function as it has no effect on the solution (since
it is a positive constant). In the next section, we
will denote by x∗ the solution of (23) and x∗conf ∈
{0, 1}|Aconf | will denote the restriction of x∗ to the set
Aconf .
3.3 Adversarial signal control policy
The signal tampering problem is formulated as a bi-
objective optimization program, where we simul-
taneously seek to determine a control policy that
leads to maximum adversarial impact in the net-
work but at minimum noticeability. We call the re-
sulting policy the adversarial signal control policy
and denote by xAconf ∈ {0, 1}|Aconf | the intersection
flows that result from the adversarial policy. Let
x∗S and x
A
S denote the vector of flows into the sink
node under optimal control and adversarial control,
respectively. The adversarial control policy can be
inferred from the solution of the bi-objective pro-
gramming problem
xAS ∈ arg min
x∈Z|A|+
{
Z1(xS), Z2(xconf) : Ax = b, x ≤ u
}
,
(24)
where the objective functions Z1 : AV/S → Z+ and
Z2 : Aconf → Z+ are given by
Z1(xS) = −‖x∗S − xS‖1 (25)
and
Z2(xconf) = ‖x∗conf − xconf‖0. (26)
The function ‖ · ‖1 is the usual `1-norm and ‖ · ‖0
is the 0 pseudo-norm. We assume that x∗S and
x∗conf are known a-priori. Hence, minimizing Z1 can
be interpreted as maximizing the deviation in net-
work travel times from the one achieved under op-
timal control. Minimizing Z2 can be interpreted as
finding a control strategy which results in smallest
change in control variables from that achieved with
optimal control. Hence, the bi-objective program-
ming problem can interpreted as one that seeks
to find a control policy that impacts performance
greatly while simultaneously going unnoticed.
The first objective can be simplified to
Z1(xS) = −(x∗S − xS) = xS − x∗S. (27)
This follows from the equivalence of the system
travel time minimizing solution and the maximal
flow solution (see, e.g., [1]). Hence the cumulative
vehicle arrivals (over time) curve under a optimal
control solution lies above any other cumulative ar-
rivals curve.
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The second objective, Z2, is generally non-convex
but noting that (feasible) flows in Aconf are binary
under the proposed representation for conflicting
movements, we have the convex equivalent:
Z2(xconf) = ‖x∗conf − xconf‖0 = ‖x∗conf − xconf‖1.
(28)
To further simplify this, we employ a standard trick
used in linear programming: introduce two binary
vectors denoted x+conf ∈ {0, 1}Aconf and x−conf ∈
{0, 1}Aconf and add the system of equations
xconf = x+conf − x−conf (29)
to the system. The addition of these constraints are
equivalent, from the graph representation perspec-
tive, to every flow in the network corresponding
to an element of xconf being replaced by an identi-
cal element of x+conf and a new mirror image in x
+
conf .
By mirror image, what is meant here is a flow that
connects the same two nodes with the same capac-
ity but points in the opposite direction. Hence, this
substitution has no impact on the graph structure of
the problem or the total unimodularity of the con-
straints.
As far as the objective function Z2 is concerned,
the equality given in (29) results in the following
bound:
‖x∗conf − xconf‖1 = ‖x∗conf − x+conf + x−conf‖1
≤ x∗conf + x+conf + x−conf , (30)
which means that, without loss of generality, Z2 can
be replaced by the linear objective function:
Z2(x+conf , x
−
conf) = x
∗
conf + x
+
conf + x
−
conf . (31)
The resulting bi-objective programming problem is
minimize
x,x+conf ,x
−
conf
Z1(xS) (32)
minimize
x,x+conf ,x
−
conf
Z2(x+conf , x
−
conf) (33)
s.t. Ax = b, (34)
xconf − x+conf + x−conf = 0, (35)
x ≤ u, (36)
x ∈ R|A|+ , x+conf , x+conf ∈ [0, 1]|Aconf |. (37)
Note that we employed the trivial linear relaxation
in (37). This is warranted by the total unimodular-
ity of the constraint set, that is, we are still guar-
anteed integer optimal solutions. This is true for
each of the objective functions coupled with the
constraints. Thus, it is also true for any weighted
combination of the two objective functions, which
is the standard approach to solving bi-objective pro-
gramming problems. There also exist traditional
techniques that ensure that all efficient solutions are
discovered (i.e., the entire Pareto-optimal frontier is
determined) [2, 18]. Such techniques involve itera-
tively solving single objective problem but adding
the other objective to the constraint set. In our
case, this too does not violate total unimodular-
ity. For example, minimizing Z1 subject to (34) -
(37) and Z2 = z2 for some given constant z2, we
have the original TU system with rows from an
identity matrix added to them. The latter oper-
ation is TU-preserving. The exact same argument
is true in the case where one minimizes Z2 sub-
ject to (34) - (37) and Z1 = z1 for some constant
z1. Hence, efficient (polynomial-time) techniques
can be employed to iteratively solve the bi-objective
programming problem (32) - (37) and obtain the en-
tire Pareto-optimal frontier. For the sake of com-
pleteness, we include the algorithm we employed
below. To simplify notation, we represent the con-
straints (34) - (37) as the set X and with slight no-
tation abuse, the vector x includes x+conf and x
−
conf .
Pareto frontier and network vulnerability. Each point
along the Pareto-optimal frontier is a candidate so-
lution which meets the dual criteria of maximum
network vehicle throughput deviation and mini-
mum noticeability. Due to the discrete nature of the
problem, the pareto frontier is scatter-plot (a set of
extreme points that are not connected). We shall
illustrate the Pareto frontier as a piecewise linear
curve (i.e., we will connect the points) to analyze
the shape of the curve. We examine the concavity
of the resulting curve and use this as a measure of
vulnerability of the network. The more concave the
curve is, the more vulnerable the network is to an
adversarial attack. To visualize this, consider the
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Algorithm 1: Pareto-optimal frontier for adver-
sarial problem
Data:
Result: The Pareto-optimal frontier F
1 Initialize: z[1]1 ← [ min{Z1 : x ∈ X}
2 z[1]2 ← [ min{Z2 : Z1 ← [ z[1]1 , x ∈ X}
3 z[2]2 ← [ min{Z2 : x ∈ X}
4 z[2]1 ← [ min{Z1 : Z2 ← [ z[2]2 , x ∈ X}
5 if (z[1]1 , z
[1]
2 ) 6= (z[2]1 , z[2]2 ) then
6 K ← [ {[1, 2]} // set of candidate vertices
of Pareto frontier
7 F ← [ ∅ // set of final vertices of Pareto
frontier
8 k← [ 3
9 else
10 Stop
11 end
12 while K 6= ∅ do
13 Choose any [r, s] ∈ K
14 Calculate the weights:
15 w[r,s]1 ← [ |z[s]2 − z[r]2 |
16 w[r,s]2 ← [ |z[s]1 − z[r]1 |
17 Solve the following two problems:
18 z¯← [ min{w[r,s]1 Z1 + w[r,s]2 Z2 : x ∈ X}
19 x← [ arg min{Z1 : w[r,s]1 Z1 + w[r,s]2 Z2 = z¯, x ∈X}
20 Calculate candidate solution:
21 (z¯1, z¯2)← [ (Z1(xS), Z2(x+conf , x−conf))
22 if (z¯1, z¯2) = (z
[r]
1 , z
[r]
2 ) or (z¯1, z¯2) = (z
[s]
1 , z
[s]
2 ) then
23 F ← [ F ∪ [r, s]
24 K ← [ K/[r, s]
25 else
26 z[k]1 , z
[k]
2 ← z¯1, z¯2
27 K ← [ K ∪ {[r, k], [k, s]}
28 K ← [ K/[r, s]
29 k← k + 1
30 end
31 end
two Pareto frontiers obtained for two different (hy-
pothetical) networks A and B in Fig. 6. In Fig. 6,
an amount equivalent to z2 change in the signal
control results in a change in throughput equal to
z1,A for network A and z1,B for network B. Clearly,
z1,B > z1,A, implying that network B is more vulner-
Number of signal changes 
required (minimize)
Cumulative vehicle 
throughput deviations
(maximize)
z2
z1,A
z1,B
Pareto frontier obtained for Network A
Pareto frontier obtained for Network B
PB
PA
z2
z1,A
z1,B
Pareto frontier obtained for Network A
Pareto frontier obtained for Network B
PB
PA
z2
z1,A
z1,B
Pareto frontier obtained for Network A
Pareto frontier obtained for Network B
PB PA
mB
mA
FIGURE 6: Pareto-optimal frontier for two hypothetical
networks A and B.
able than network A. Note here that the slope mea-
sured at the origin, which we will denote by mA for
network A, essentially tells how vulnerable the net-
work is from an initial optimal state. The larger the
value of m, the more vulnerable the network is to
an attack. One can also investigate slope and cur-
vature at various points along the curve to deter-
mine the vulnerability and stability of the network
to prolonged attacks.
4 Numerical Experiments and Results
We perform numerical experiments to test the pro-
posed adversarial model on a few selected road net-
works, and discuss the dependence of network vul-
nerability on the network structure, vehicular traffic
demand and duration of attack. We consider three
homogeneous (or regular) road networks with uni-
form degree distributions and one random (or ir-
regular) network with non-uniform degree distri-
bution for the experiment; see Fig. 7. All of the net-
works in the examples have the same spatial area
(= 2.5 km2), but vary in numbers of intersections,
link lengths, origin (or destination) locations, and
network regularity. These are detailed in Table 1.
All the road links in the network have a single lane
and only permit one-way traffic. For each network,
we conduct a set of experiments with different traf-
fic demands and attack durations. We assume a dis-
crete time step length of ∆τ = 2 seconds, a maxi-
mum cell occupancy (Ni) of 5 vehicles per cell, and
a flow capacity of Qi = 1 vehicle per time step per
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TABLE 1: Characteristics of the test networks
Network type
Number
of intersections
Number
of links
Average
link length
Number of
source/sink points
(A) Low density regular network 4 12 500 4
(B) Medium density regular network 9 24 375 6
(C) High density regular network 16 40 250 8
(D) High density irregular network 23 - 100 9/8
R3 R4
R1
R2
S3
S4
S2S1
1 2
43
S4
S5
S6
R4 R5 R6
S1 S2 S3
1 2 3
654
7 8 9
R1
R2
R3
R4
R5 R6 R7 R8
S5
S6
S7
S8
S1 S2 S3 S4
1 2 3 4
5 6 7 8
9 10 11 12
16151413
R1
R2
R3
R4 R5R6 R7 R8 R9
S1 S2S3 S4
S5
S6
S7
S8
1
2
3 4 5
6 7 8 9
10 11 12 13
14 15 16
17 18
19
20
21
22 23
(a) Network A
R3 R4
R1
R2
S3
S4
S2S1
1 2
43
R1
R2
R3
S4
S5
S6
R4 R5 R6
S1 S2 S3
1 2 3
654
7 8 9
R5 R6 R7 R8
S5
S6
S7
S8
S1 S2 S3 S4
1 2 3 4
5 6 7 8
9 10 11 12
16151413
R1
R2
R3
R4 R5 6 R7 R8 R9
S1 S2 3 S4
S5
S6
S7
S8
1
2
3 4 5
6 7 8 9
10 11 12 13
14 15 16
17 18
19
20
21
22 23
(b) Network B
R3 R4
R1
R2
S3
S4
S2S1
1 2
43
R1
R2
R3
S4
S5
S6
R4 R5 R6
S1 S2 S3
1 2 3
654
7 8 9
R1
R2
R3
R4
R5 R6 R7 R8
S5
S6
S7
S8
S1 S2 S3 S4
1 2 3 4
5 6 7 8
9 10 11 12
16151413
5R6 R7 R8 R9
S2S3 S4
S5
S6
S7
S8
2
3 4 5
7 8 9
11
12 13
14 15 16
17 18
19
20
21
23
(c) Network C
R3 R4
R1
R2
S3
S4
S2S1
1 2
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R1
R2
R3
S4
S5
S6
R4 R5 R6
S1 S2 S3
1 2 3
654
7 8 9
R1
R2
R3
R4
5 6 R7 R8
S5
S6
S7
S8
S1 S2 S3 S4
1 2 3 4
5 6 7 8
9 10 11 12
16151413
R1
R2
R3
R4 R5R6 R7 R8 R9
S1 S2 S3 S4
S
S6
S7
S8
1
2
3 4 5
6 7 8 9
10 11 12 13
14 15 16
17 8
19
20
21
22 23
(d) Network D
FIGURE 7: Test network layouts Network elements la-
beled ‘R’ correspond to sources, network elements la-
beled ‘S’ correspond to sinks.
lane. These are typical values for an urban lane. The
super-graph and bi-objective attack problem for the
test networks are implemented using Python pro-
gramming language and are available online [19].
All linear optimization programs are solved using
the Gurobi optimization solver [8]. The experimental
results are discussed below.
Network vulnerability. We first investigate net-
work vulnerability in general by examining the con-
cavity of the Pareto frontier in Fig. 8 for the low-
density and high-density networks under a uni-
form traffic demand of 600 vehicles per hour at the
network sources (low traffic demands). The dura-
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(b) Network C
FIGURE 8: Pareto-optimal frontiers for Network A and
Network C.
tion of the attack is 15 minutes (450 time steps). We
see a flatter curve in Fig. 8a compared to Fig. 8b
indicating that the higher density network is more
vulnerable in low demand scenarios. This is reason-
able as Network C has more intersections per unit
area than Network A.
Impact of network structure. To understand the re-
lationship between network structure and network
vulnerability, we compare the Pareto frontiers (on
a normalized scale) obtained for all the test net-
works in Fig. 9. The attack duration is 15 minutes
(450 times steps) in the experiments. Fig. 9a com-
pares the networks under low traffic demands (400
veh/hr or 100 vehicles over the entire horizon at
each source), Fig. 9b compares the networks under
moderate traffic demands (800 veh/hr or 200 ve-
hicles over the entire horizon at each source), and
Fig. 9c compares the networks under heavy traf-
fic demands (1200 veh/hr or 300 vehicles over the
entire horizon at each source). In Fig. 9a, we see
that at the origin point, the slope values follow:
mD > mC > mB > mA, implying the Network D
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FIGURE 9: Comparison of Pareto-optimal curves ob-
tained for all test networks at various demand levels to
see the relationship between network structure and net-
work vulnerability. Sub-figures represent the compari-
son at different traffic demand levels (Blue: Network A,
Orange: Network B, Green: Network C, Red: Network
D).
is the most vulnerable and Network A is the least
vulnerable in low demand scenarios. The high vul-
nerability of Network D could be attributed to its
irregular structure and non-uniform degree distri-
bution, for which there exist large degree nodes and
are found to be more unstable under attacks. How-
ever, along the Pareto curve, the slopes reduce at a
faster rate for Network D than Network A, imply-
ing that Network D tends to be more resilient than
other networks under prolonged attacks. Similar
insights can be observed from the Pareto curves ob-
tained for the moderate and high demand scenarios
in Fig. 9b and Fig. 9c.
Impact of traffic demands. We next study the effect
of varying traffic demands; this is shown in Fig. 10.
For each network, we observe that the number of
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FIGURE 10: Illustration of network vulnerability with
varying demand levels (Green: low demand scenario,
Orange: moderate demand scenario, Blue: high demand
scenario).
non-dominated solutions defining the Pareto fron-
tier increases as demands increase. The more in-
teresting observation is the similar shapes of the
curves across demand levels, particularly for the
uniform networks (Networks A - C). This similar-
ity suggests that demand levels have no impact on
a network’s vulnerability, which is defined by the
shape of the Pareto frontier. We also see that the ir-
regularity of Network D affords it less vulnerability
to adversarial attacks than the uniform networks.
Impact of attack duration. Finally, Fig. 11 illustrates
the impact of attack duration. There are two note-
worthy observations: the first observation is that
all four networks are more vulnerable to longer at-
tacks. This is to be expected. The second obser-
vation is that the Pareto curves scale exponentially
with duration and it appears that this scaling is the
same across the four networks.
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FIGURE 11: Comparison of Pareto-optimal curves under
different attack durations. (Green: 20 minutes = 600 time
steps, Orange: 15 minutes = 450 timee steps, Blue: 10
minutes = 300 time steps).
5 Conclusion
A trend that is sweeping traffic signal systems
worldwide is the move to wireless communication
between sensors and controllers and between con-
trollers and the signal heads. Communication be-
tween the intersections and the traffic management
centers is also moving to wireless. This creates vul-
nerabilities to cyber attacks at various levels in the
signal control system. This paper considers the sce-
nario in which an adversary gains access to the
system and we model an attack that is intended
to create congestion in the network with minimal
changes to the signal timing plans. The contribu-
tions of this paper are summarized as (i) the devel-
opment of a representation of urban traffic dynam-
ics as flows in a static directed (capacitated) graph,
(ii) a model of the signal tampering attack as a bi-
objective programming problem, and (iii) a demon-
stration that the problem can be solved to optimal-
ity using classical techniques. Furthermore, we pro-
vide examples of insights that can be extracted from
the Pareto-optimal frontier that is obtained as a so-
lution to our bi-objective problem. Specifically, we
examine the concavity of the curve as a measure of
vulnerability of the urban traffic network.
Some of the observations that we make in our
experiments suggest some scale-free properties of
Pareto-optimal curves. For example, we observe
that the curves have the same shape under differ-
ent demand levels. We also observe an exponen-
tial scaling property with increasing attack dura-
tions that appears to be transferable from one net-
work to another. These observations suggest that
the vulnerability of a network is an intrinsic prop-
erty that is independent of demand level, attack du-
ration, and in some cases (perhaps) network struc-
ture. These observations motivate future research
directions along these lines.
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first pa-
per to treat the concavity of a Pareto-frontier as a
way to gauge the vulnerability of a network. This
idea is transferable to any type of network in which
there exist trade-offs between impact and notice-
ability, two broad notions that are always at odds
with one another.
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